I. INTRODUCTION
Over the twenty-five years since a special Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine Case), 1 legal scholars have written extensively on the significance of the ruling to influence Canada-U.S. relations specifically, and international arbitration in general. 2 While the rationale behind any particular scholar's interest in the case has varied over the years, its significance in informing deliberation surrounding maritime boundary delimitation owes much to the fact that the case presented many "firsts." Among these were: the use of a special Chamber of the Court; 3 the decision by Canada to submit the dispute to an international tribunal on its own behalf; 4 and the request that a decision be made on a "single maritime boundary" that would include, not only the seabed beyond the limits of the territorial OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 sea, but also the water column.
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In addition to its uniqueness, the significance of this request for a single boundary to delineate both seabed and fisheries resources has led many scholars, and even one of the judges of the Chamber, to question the legality and appropriateness of the request. 6 As only the third case of maritime boundary delimitation to be heard by the Court at the time, the Gulf of Maine Case highlighted the Chamber's novel use of a hierarchy of principles, equitable criteria, and practical methods in reaching its decision. 7 At the same time, it has been subject to much criticism. 8 Commentators have noted that the challenge of maritime boundary delimitation is to "reconcile conflicting claims to a maritime extension of coasts that differ in configuration, length and position in relation to the area to be delimited."
9 While solutions to this problem have been attempted in decisions rendered by the Chamber 10 and the full Court 11 over its sixty-five year history, 12 assessing these judgments for guidance on maritime boundary delimitation is not the aim of this Article. Rather, its purpose is to focus on the issues confronting Canada and the United States after the Gulf of Maine decision was 5. SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO SUBMIT TO A CHAMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF THE GULF OF MAINE AREA, Article 2 (2), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES /PDFFILES/TREATIES/CAN-USA1979MB.PDF.
6. Judge Gros, one of the five judges of the Chamber, questioned how the parties could relieve themselves from the obligation of Article 6 of the 1958 United Nation Convention on the Continental Shelf simply by asking the Court to rule on a single boundary for both the seabed and the water column. He contended that since Article 6 called for the principle of equidistance to be applied in delimiting the seabed, in theory, two boundaries, one for the seabed and one for the water column, could be a likely outcome. The Chamber concluded that Article 6 was not applicable to the delimitation of a single maritime boundary. Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 365 (Gros, J., dissenting). rendered and to explore how these two "friendly" neighboring states have attempted to pursue the principles of cooperation and agreement following the decision of the Court. 13 As such, this Article is structured around five key components and is aimed at: (1) highlighting the underlying economic rationale behind why the two neighboring countries of Canada and the United States sought to clarify a single maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine; (2) identifying the challenges confronting the parties in managing their ocean resources, after ownership had been established, particularly in light of growing energy-related exploitation demands; (3) discussing mechanisms for ocean planning and management adopted by each party to utilize its living and non-living resources; (4) presenting two examples of existing bilateral cooperation from which lessons can be gleaned for future collaborative efforts; and (5) identifying policy options and an implementation mechanism for transboundary cooperation in the Gulf of Maine that could potentially meet the objectives of both countries as they seek to implement marine spatial planning in their respective maritime zones.
II. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR PURSUING A BOUNDARY DELIMITATION DECISION IN THE GULF OF MAINE
While evidence exists of sentiments of national pride and national honor being aroused by threats to territory 14 and some scholars have pointed to the psychological importance of territory that exceeds its intrinsic value, 15 it is clear that the exponential expansion of ocean territory by coastal states has arisen primarily over securing access to offshore resources.
Key among these are fisheries resources, hydrocarbon deposits, and, more recently, the production of renewable forms of energy using wind, tides, and currents.
Canada and the United States have disputed each other's maritime boundary claims in all three of their shared ocean spaces. 16 To date, the 13. In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber referred to the historical friendliness and cooperation between Canada and the United States and expressed confidence that the "parties will surely be able to surmount any difficulties and take the right steps to ensure the positive development of their activities . . . ." Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 344.
14. 17 and the evidence strongly suggests that that the driver behind this decision was economic in nature. 18 While the parties called for a single maritime boundary to be drawn from the coast two hundred miles seaward, within the 90,000 square kilometer Gulf of Maine, the focus of the dispute was identified as Georges Bank, over which ownership of some forty-two percent of the Bank was in dispute. 19 Georges Bank is a broad, shallow, detached marine area of approximately 45,000 square kilometers (300 km x 150 km) located on the continental shelf seaward of the Gulf of Maine but within the delimitation area, off the coasts of Massachusetts and Southwestern Nova Scotia. Water depths are less than 100 meters over most of the Bank. The area has been studied by Canadian and American researchers for more than 100 years and the existing scientific knowledge has been well documented and summarized. Gulf of Maine and more importantly, an area of approximately 7000 square kilometers on Georges Bank. The decision to refer the dispute to the ICJ for a final and binding decision followed questions of ownership over both fishing and hydrocarbon resources. In the case of the fishery resources, overlapping areas became evident 21 when each of the two nations responded to extensive foreign fishing pressures by claiming in legislation 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive fishing zones (EFZ) in the mid-to-late 1970s.
22 Disagreement over the seabed arose following the claiming of exclusive jurisdiction over the non-living resources of the continental shelf in 1945 23 and the subsequent granting of hydrocarbon permits by Canada in 1964. 24 The Canadian government leased the first parcel of land on Georges Bank to Texaco Canada Inc. in 1964. By 1986, Chevron, BP-Amoco and Texaco held large exploration permits covering the East Georges Bank Basin. These permits covered the entire Canadian portion of the Bank and in the case of BP-Amoco leases, extended off the Bank into deeper waters. In 1986, efforts by Texaco, aimed at soliciting public support for exploratory activities, coincided with the call for a provincial election. This resulted in political pressure being applied by the fishing constituency in the Southwestern portion of the province. 25 The power of the fishing constituency led to a political decision by the federal and provincial governments imposing a thirteen-year moratorium on petroleum activity on the Canadian portion of Georges Bank. This decision resulted in both the U.S. and Canadian portions of Georges Bank being subject to a ban on petroleum-related activities.
In the United States, ten exploratory wells were drilled on the undisputed U.S. portion of Georges Bank between 1976 and 1982. This activity was associated with the only successful lease offering by the United States for the Georges Bank area.
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None of the wells encountered significant concentrations of petroleum resources. Starting in 1982, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of one-year leasing moratoria on portions of the Outer Continental Shelf. This eventually led to an executive order by President William J. Clinton in 1998, preventing any leases from being offered for a period of fourteen years, in areas that were currently under moratorium. While there are no outstanding leases on the U.S. portion of the Bank, the three leaseholders on the Canadian portion of the Bank continue to hold exclusive exploration rights. However, these are suspended while the moratorium remains in effect. 27. Reflecting the growing recognition of public involvement in decision-making, the legislation also called for a public review to be established prior to the termination date of the moratorium. The review panel was authorized to examine the environmental and socio-economic impacts associated with exploration and drilling on Georges Bank and to make its recommendation to the responsible federal and provincial Ministers by July 1, 1999. The Ministers were charged with making a decision, prior to January 1, 2000, on whether the moratorium would be extended. In keeping with the legislative requirements in both the federal and provincial Accord Acts, a review process was conducted to examine the issues associated with oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank. Following the review process, the three-member panel recommended the extension of the moratorium. MULLALLY ET AL., GEORGES BANK REVIEW PANEL REPORT (1999) Technological advances at the time of, and subsequent to, the 1945 Truman Declaration 31 clearly presented opportunities to exploit the hydrocarbon resources believed to be present on Georges Bank. However, the lack of drilling success, coupled with the political strength of the fishing sector in both Canada and the United States, significantly reduced the economic role of the petroleum sector as a key driver behind boundary delimitation at the time. Rather, the evidence more likely supports the role of Georges Bank as an important and traditional fishing ground for Canadian and U.S. fishers, due to its uniquely high biological productivity, as the principal economic driver behind the pursuit for a binding decision by the ICJ.
Georges Bank has been reported to sustain levels of fish productivity two to three times greater than comparable continental shelf areas, such as the Gulf of Maine, Scotian Shelf, and North Sea. 32 However, as with the conflicting claims over the ownership of the seabed, the two countries also claimed 200 nautical mile EFZs in 1977, which resulted in overlapping boundaries.
In 1978, both countries suspended the implementation of a 1977 Interim Fishing Agreement that allowed fishers from both countries access to areas in which they had traditionally fished, regardless of the newly-established EFZ boundaries. 33 In an attempt to resolve the disputes, a treaty 34 was signed by both countries in 1979 to submit the delimitation of the maritime boundary and an Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources 35 to binding dispute settlement. The linking of the two issues required them both to be ratified by each country for either to come into force. However, the linkage was subsequently severed in 1981, due to massive opposition from the U.S. fishing industry in New England over the terms of the agreement.
36 Canada agreed to proceed with the boundary dispute (providing a comprehensive examination of the factors influencing the decision to extend the petroleum moratorium on Canadian side of Georges Bank allocation, and specifically fisheries resources, as a key driver behind the pursuit of a binding settlement, it is appropriate to briefly describe the challenges and efforts undertaken to overcome them in the years following the decision. Additionally, this section will highlight some of the challenging issues that could arise from emerging ocean uses such as renewable energy exploitation and the efforts by both countries to seize existing opportunities within the Gulf of Maine.
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A. The Fisheries
As described by Emily Pudden and Professor David VanderZwaag, fisheries management continued to be handled in a unilateral manner by Canada and the United States in the years immediately following the ICJ decision. 45 This persisted as the norm until 1995, when the continuing collapse of groundfish stocks on both sides of the line resulted in the establishment of the Canada-U.S. Steering Committee. This nonlegislative, bilateral, advisory body is co-chaired by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) Regional Director General (Maritimes Region) and the United States Northeast Regional Administrator, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). In an effort to manage the three transboundary groundfish stocks of Georges Bankcod, haddock, and yellow flounder-the Committee has the mandate of conducting joint stock assessments and recommending a sharing agreement for the total allowable catch (TAC) for these stocks. Since its formation, and following the success of the first joint stock assessment for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder conducted in 1997, a number of institutional arrangements have evolved under the auspices of the Steering Committee. Today, the work of the Committee is undertaken by the species-specific 46 Transboundary Resources Assessment 44. Since both countries implemented unilateral moratoria regarding offshore oil and gas exploitation in the Outer Continental Shelf at the time of the ICJ decision or soon thereafter, this Article will not discuss the petroleum sector efforts undertaken within each country. While no hydrocarbon exploitation has occurred on either side of the Hague Line to date, there is no longer a moratorium on the U. The TMGC, in turn, provides advice on the status of the stocks and a proposed sharing of the TACs to the Canada-U.S. Integration Committee whose mandate is to ensure the integration of policies and consistency in approach across the TMGC and other working groups of the Steering Committee, including the Oceans, Habitat, and Species at Risk working groups.
Agreement on the sharing formula by the two countries required some degree of compromise as the United States placed more weight on historical landings while Canada favored distribution of the resource. Consensus was reached on the sharing formula that provided for a sevenyear transitional schedule, with allocation percentages that take into account both contemporary resource distribution and historical utilization patterns. 47 The implementation of the recommended allocation in each country occurs through the inclusion of the TAC in the respective fisheries management plans, issued under the authority of the DFO (for Canada) and the New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) (for the United States). The TMGC submits its recommendations to the NEFMC, while in Canada, it liaises with the Gulf of Maine Advisory Council (GOMAC), comprised of federal and provincial government representatives, as well as the fishing industry and the Canadian Consul in Boston, who makes the recommendation to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. However, it is important to note that the responsible agencies are not required to implement the recommendations of the Canada-U.S. Bilateral Steering Committee and may opt to increase, decrease, or maintain the status quo levels for each of the transboundary species in their respective fisheries management plans. 48 47. Id. at 38. 48. The Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP) specifies a procedure for setting annual hard TAC levels for the U.S./Canada Management Area for GB cod (Gadus morhua), GB haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), and GB yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea). This action is needed to ensure that the stocks of GB cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder that are shared between the United States and Canada, are managed as required by the FMP and as outlined in the U.S./Canada Resource Sharing Understanding (Understanding). The Understanding specifies an allocation of TAC for these three stocks for each country, based on a formula that considers historical catch percentages and current resource distribution. The purpose of this action is to implement TACs for these three stocks that will be consistent with the Understanding and the FMP. Apart from agreement on the management and sharing of allocation of the transboundary resources, another significant challenge confronting the two countries as a result of the establishment of the Hague Line was the issue of illegal fishing, particularly on the Canadian side. Noncompliance with the boundary line rose to a peak in 1989, spurred by the discrepancy in the penalties for illegal fishing. 49 In the United States, the maximum fine under the Lacey Act 50 was $10,000, while in Canada, the penalties included a fine of $100,000, confiscation of the catch, seizure of the vessel, and possible imprisonment. 51 To address this problem, the "Agreement between the Government of the United States and Canada on Fisheries Enforcement" was negotiated between the two countries in 1990, 52 making it illegal for nationals of one nation to not respect the laws and regulations of the other nation if operating within the jurisdiction of that nation. The Agreement, which included consistency with the stricter Canadian penalties, was implemented through each country's national legislation, 53 and included regular cooperation, sharing of monitoring, control, and surveillance information, and joint patrolling along the Hague Line.
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The outcome of the Agreement has been positive, with the number of violations decreasing substantial since its introduction. 55 Additionally, due to a shared commitment to rebuild the stocks in the Gulf of Maine, management efforts have facilitated a In assessing the challenges and actions arising from the establishment of the Hague Line with regard to fisheries resources, it is tempting to conclude that the collaborative, voluntary, and mandatory practices implemented by Canada and the United States were exactly those which the Chamber had in mind when it voiced its hope for cooperation and agreement by the two parties. 57 To that end, it would appear that there are valuable lessons other states can learn from the behavior of Canada and the United States, notwithstanding the call for a greater commitment by the two countries to an integrated transboundary ecosystem management approach in the Gulf of Maine.
U.S./Canada Management Area--Final Environmental Assessment--Regulatory Impact
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B. Offshore Renewable Energy
While the issues surrounding transboundary fisheries have a long and well-established history in the Gulf of Maine that is familiar to both Canada and the United States, offshore renewable energy is a new and emerging activity for both countries. The attention given to renewable energy generation globally and in Canada and the United States is driven in large measure by three areas of concern, namely the growing recognition of the impacts of climate change on the earth's systems, the rising costs of energy derived from conventional non-renewable sources, and the need for both countries to ensure energy security. 59 While there is considerable debate over the sources of global warming, concern over its impacts has been increasing among policy makers, scientists, and the general public on a global scale. Report, 61 global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years. Furthermore, the report's authors have identified carbon dioxide as the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas and have attributed the global increases in carbon dioxide concentration primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide were attributed primarily to agriculture.
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In light of the potential opportunities available for renewable sources of energy 63 to address, to varying degrees, the three areas of concern mentioned above, increasing attention is being paid to the use of the ocean environment as a source of renewable energy by both Canada and the United States. For example, in fiscal year 2008, the U.S. Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) awarded seven new ocean environmental studies related to the Offshore Alternative Energy Program (worth $3.8 million) to evaluate several aspects relating to alternative energy. 64 These studies were aimed at ensuring that the environmental consequences of alternative energy siting, operations, and interactions with other ocean resources are appropriately evaluated. Additionally, the framework will enhance partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies and tribal governments to assist in maximizing the economic and ecological benefits of OCS renewable energy development.
At the state level, two New England states are working to address the larger coastal community planning issues posed by siting renewable energy projects in the ocean. 68. Note that the term "adjacent coastal States" refers to states within the United States, not nation-states. This sharing of revenues in the Energy Policy Act raises an interesting question for cross-border countries such as Canada and the United States regarding the potential for shared revenues. Currently, the Act requires payment to eligible states of twenty seven percent of the revenues from any projects located wholly or partially within the area extending between three and six miles from shore. It also requires equitable distribution of shared revenue among coastal states that are within fifteen miles of the geographic center of the project. Given the potential for projects to be within this geographic area of each other's maritime boundary, would an agreement for revenue sharing between the two countries be reasonable 70. Under the agreement, the MMS has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the production, transportation, or transmission of energy from non-hydrokinetic renewable energy projects, including wind and solar. FERC will have exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses for the construction and operation of hydrokinetic projects, including wave and current, but companies will be required to first obtain a lease through MMS.
71 project 77 is that of Cape Wind Associates (CWA), which proposes to construct a wind farm on Horseshoe Shoal, located between Cape Cod and Nantucket, in Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts. 78 The CWA project would have 130 wind turbines located as close as 4.1 miles offshore of Cape Cod in an area of approximately twenty four square miles with the turbines being placed at a minimum of one-third-miles apart. 79 The turbines will be connected by cables, which will relay the energy to shore and the power grid. If constructed, the turbines would preempt other bottom uses in an area, similar to oil and natural gas leases. The potential impacts associated with the CWA offshore wind energy project include the construction, operation, and removal of turbine platforms and transmission cables; thermal and vibration impacts; and changes to species assemblages within the area from the introduction of vertical structures.
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In Canada, there has not been a comparable level of federal activity as in the United States and there is currently only one offshore marine renewable energy project in the developmental stage on Canada's East coast. 81 Unlike the focus taken in the U.S. Northeast, efforts to advance offshore renewable energy in the Canadian Maritime provinces are focused on hydrokinetic technologies rather than wind, although there is growing attention for onshore wind generation in each of the three provinces. At the provincial level, the government of Nova Scotia Despite lessons learned in international law over principles guiding the exploitation of transboundary offshore non-renewable energy resources and the development of cooperative agreements between states driven by oil and gas resources, 86 very little attention is currently being paid in anticipation of the bilateral jurisdictional issues surrounding offshore renewable energy. According to a recent estimate from NOAA, approximately thirty-eight renewable energy projects in the U.S. Northeast are currently in various stages of approval from MMS and FERC and, among these, it would appear that approximately eight are within some proximity to the Hague Line.
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As with cross-border nonrenewable resources, it seems reasonable to expect that countries would look to UNCLOS as one of the key drivers in providing guidance related to the development of international law affecting renewable 82 88 Two key articles of the Convention that would be applicable are those pertaining to the sovereign right of the state for purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources, 89 and a coastal state's sovereign rights to explore the seabed and exploit its natural resources. 90 At the same time, it has been debated whether it is "unlawful" for a sovereign state to unilaterally exploit a common petroleum resource or whether the international legal regime is simply providing "rules of engagement" for cooperation. 91 Scholars have also drawn attention to Article 142 of the Convention, where resource deposits straddle maritime boundaries. Accordingly, prior notification to, and prior consent of, the coastal state is required when exploitation in a given area may result in exploitation of resources lying within national jurisdiction.
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Given this level of complexity and legal uncertainty surrounding a "fixed" resource such as a petroleum deposit, it is difficult to predict how the legal regime regarding dynamic renewable resources in a crossborder situation might unfold. It may very likely be that, rather than looking for guidance from examples of nonrenewable resource decisions, more relevant insights might be obtained from decisions and agreements relating to how a coastal state manages its migratory living marine resources, nested within the evolving practice of integrated management and the application of an ecosystem-based approach. 94. For example, to manage its coastal and ocean activities, twenty-nine federal departments and agencies have direct oceans-related programs with a suite of associated early in the twentieth century. However, it has proven to be highly dysfunctional in the last quarter, an era of rapid technological change, many ocean uses and an increasing display of multiple-use conflicts, particularly in the resource-rich waters overlying the continental shelf. Additional factors further complicating efforts at ocean governance have been identified as the fluid, three-dimensional nature of the medium; the complexity of the interactive ecosystems; mobility and opacity of resources and activities; and the mismatch between administrative boundaries and jurisdictional authorities and the natural environment.
IV. OCEAN PLANNING TRENDS
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To address the sectoral shortcoming to ocean-related policy formulation, the past two decades have seen an increasing call for coastal states to adopt an integrated approach to policy, program, and planning development.
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For the United States and Canada, efforts to respond institutionally and legislatively to a practice that would support a more holistic approach to management have been positive, albeit slow.
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Reviews by both American and Canadian scholars have highlighted the progress made by the countries as each attempted to shift from a single sector, "silo" approach to one that is more reflective of interconnectivities between the multiple users and uses of the coastal and ocean environments.
98 Strategies adopted for implementing integrated 100 Nonetheless, while following different paths, it seems that there is evidence to support the hope that each country has now committed to "adapt its practice to the science that has consistently shown that ecosystem-based, as opposed to sectoral, oceans management is the route to healthier and more productive oceans."
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A. Canada's Ocean Management Regime
Canada's Ocean Act and its subsequently developed Ocean Strategy 102 and Ocean Action Plan 103 reflect the underlying principles, current approach, and priorities that Canada intends to apply with respect to managing its coastal and ocean activities.
The need to increase policy coordination and coherence horizontally amongst responsible government agencies and vertically amongst responsible jurisdictions has been recognized in Canada's Oceans Act.
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This legislation, inter alia¸ brought Canadian law in line with internationally agreed-upon jurisdiction for the oceans, increased the authority of the Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans to deal with oceans management, and introduced a new mechanism, known as 'integrated management,' to Canadian oceans management. Part I of the Act comprehensively states Canada's position to assume its rights and responsibilities over maritime zones, as granted to coastal states under UNCLOS.
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Sections 4 through 19 assert Canada's claims over its maritime zones, consistent with customary international law and UNCLOS, even though Canada had not at the time ratified the Convention. This Part of the Act also asserts the rights of Canada over the seabed and subsoil in internal waters, 106 the territorial sea, 107 the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 108 and the continental shelf, 109 in accordance with the Act and international law.
Part II of the Act allows for the development and implementation of a national oceans strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal, and marine ecosystems in Canadian waters. 110 The principles of sustainable development, integrated management, and the precautionary approach to be used in guiding the development of the strategy are articulated. The legal responsibility for leading and facilitating its development and implementation is assigned to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, in collaboration with a suite of listed agencies and bodies. Included in Part II are the basic authorities and tools to be used to define the parameters of the oceans strategy. These include: the establishment of marine protected areas;
111 the establishment and enforcement of marine environmental quality guidelines, criteria, and standards for the purposes of implementing integrated management plans; 112 and the development and implementation of integrated management plans. The Oceans Act has the potential to restructure, consolidate and create a holistic approach to oceans management which could provide a mechanism for balancing the many competing ocean interests. However, it has been criticized for not living up to expectations, primarily by Canadian scholars. 121 The academic literature focuses on two particular elements of the Act: "fragmentation" and "integrated management," and it faults the Act for failing to reduce fragmentation in oceans management and failing to define many of the terms crucial to implementing integrated management. 122 An attempt to address these shortcomings is evident in Canada's Ocean Strategy (the Strategy), released almost six years after being legislated for in Part II of the Oceans Act. The goal of the Strategy is "to ensure healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current and future generations of Canadians." 123 The Strategy sets out the policy direction for ocean management in Canada and focuses on policies and programs aimed at understanding and protecting the marine environment; supporting sustainable economic opportunities; and providing international leadership.
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The commitment to work collaboratively with all levels of government and to adopt a participatory principle with regards to engaging Canadians in meeting the objectives of the Strategy is declared. 125 The framework envisions this being accomplished with a specific geographic focus-through collaboration among governmental and non-governmental representatives with interests in a given area of ocean space, either offshore (large ocean management areas) or in areas designated as coastal management areas. stakeholder input and improve coordination in ocean management include the establishment of new and existing committees, management boards, and other forms of information sharing. Secondly, the Strategy identifies integrated management as the cornerstone of Canadian ocean governance and notes the explicit link between conservation and protection of ecosystems, while at the same time providing opportunities for creating wealth in oceans-related economies and communities. 126 It also highlights the adoption of sustainable development explicitly, with its reference to bringing together "the environmental, economic and social considerations by planning for sustainable use of the oceans in a safe and secure environment." 127 Finally, the Strategy recognizes the need to engage Canadians in promoting stewardship and awareness of the oceans for present and future generations.
Critiques of the Strategy have focused on the general nature of the policy, recognizing that as a national policy, specificities would have to be addressed in the more detailed integrated management plans. 128 While adopting an ecosystem approach, it was noted that the boundaries of the proposed large ocean management areas appeared to be more administratively and jurisdictionally based than functional or ecosystembased. 129 Efforts at integrated management and collaborative processes were viewed as a plus. However, a gap was noted in the need to clarify the accountability structure in the event of problems arising as a result of actions undertaken by these collaborative mechanisms, consisting of government and non-government actors.
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The Strategy was also criticized for lacking the appropriate evaluation mechanism to fully capture the lessons learned from its "learning by doing" adaptive approach.
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Complementary to the Strategy, Canada's Ocean Action Plan, released in May 2005, outlined the priorities for action and allocated some twenty-eight million dollars to implement these activities over a two-year period. Four main areas of focus were outlined for action. The first activity addressed "International Leadership, Sovereignty and Security," in which efforts to work collaboratively with the United States in the Gulf of Maine to address transboundary fisheries management and improve environmental protection emergency response were identified. The second activity focused on implementing "Integrated Management" planning for five large ocean management areas, including continuing the efforts to develop an Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan. The third activity centered on "Health of the Oceans" and the development of a Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy and greater enforcement activity on Canada's east coast to better identify and investigate marine pollution from ships transiting Canadian waters. The fourth area of emphasis addressed "Science and Technology" with the development of an Ocean Technology Network.
Current efforts to advance integrated management on the Maritimes Region of Canada have focused on the adoption of marine spatial planning (MSP) and the legislative framework needed to facilitate MSP implementation. 132 The slow pace of implementation of an Integrated Management approach has led to suggestions for policy renewal, program review, and critical analysis. The potential ability of MSP to meet the intent of the Oceans Act and the expectations of the engaged public citizenry that has participated in the development process of integrated management to date was considered significant, particularly in light of the lessons being learned internationally.
Based on a preliminary analysis, 133 it would appear that Canada has at least three options for creating a functional MSP regime: (i) amending the Oceans Act, (ii) reinterpreting the Oceans Act; and (iii) using a Federal Cabinet Directive. However, any of these methods would require significant political consensus, as will the long-term application of any marine spatial plan. An MSP regime established by the Canadian federal government will also have to address its inability to manage the governing competencies granted to the provinces by the Constitution Act. 134 This can be done through the creation of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the provinces but, given the jurisdictional complexity in Canada, their necessity may make marine spatial plans in some regions impractical. For example, while in theory the Gulf of St. Lawrence would be an ideal location for MSP based on its ecology and high usage, the need to coordinate management between multiple federal, provincial, municipal, and aboriginal governments and government agencies make successful MSP in the region unlikely. On the other hand, areas like the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM) area and the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine are likely better candidates for successful marine spatial plans in Canada.
B. U.S. Ocean Planning
Pursuant to the Oceans Act of 2000, the United States established a sixteen-member Commission on Ocean Policy (the Commission) "to make recommendations for coordinated and comprehensive national ocean policy." 135 The Commission issued its final report-"An Ocean Blueprint for the 21
st Century"-in September 2004.
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The report contained over 200 recommendations for U.S. ocean and coastal policy. 137 In response to some of these recommendations, President George W. Bush established a Committee on Ocean Policy 138 as part of the Council on Environmental Quality, a coordinating body within the Executive Office of the President. 139 Shortly thereafter, the Commission expired under the terms of the Ocean Act of 2000.
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In the meantime, the national interest in marine renewable energies blossomed. A proposal to establish the first U.S. off-shore wind farm off the coast of Massachusetts grabbed the nation's attention and forced Massachusetts to examine its coastal and marine priorities. Indeed, as explained above, the state passed its own Oceans Act in 2008, calling for a comprehensive ocean management plan. As required, the Executive Its charge includes "developing a recommendation for a national policy that ensures protection, maintenance, and restoration of oceans, our coasts and the Great Lakes" and recommending "a framework for improved stewardship, and effective coastal and marine spatial planning."
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The Task Force issued its interim report on September 10, 2009. In preparing the report, the Task Force consulted the report prepared by the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. 149 The Task Force gently suggested that the Committee on Ocean Policy established following that report was only "moderately effective" in bringing federal agencies together to coordinate national ocean policy, and that there was much room for improvement in setting a strong overarching policy for national ocean priorities; getting high-level direction and policy guidance from a "clear and identifiable authority;" and creating enhanced "ongoing and active engagement with state, tribal, and local authorities, and regional governance structures" among other things. action. The NOC would be responsible for advising the President on the "National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts and the Great Lakes," and would also have overall responsibility for implementing the National Policy. 153 To carry out its functions, the NOC would be comprised of a steering committee, an Ocean Resource Management Interagency Policy Committee, an Ocean Science and Technology Interagency Policy Committee, and a Governance Advisory Committee. 154 The latter would consist of members representing states, tribes, and regional governance structures, and would "provide input to the NOC on issues of inter-jurisdictional collaboration and cooperation on the National Policy and related matters."
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One of the nine priority objectives listed in the Task Force's Interim Report is coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP).
156 Accordingly, on December 9, 2009, the Task Force issued another report titled "Interim Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning." 157 The report notes that most federal permitting processes for myriad ocean uses "focus solely on a limited range of management tools and outcomes" rather than incorporating a "more integrated, comprehensive, ecosystem-based, flexible, and proactive approach to planning and managing these uses and activities." 158 The proposed framework for CMSP "is intended to yield substantial economic, ecological, and social benefits" by incorporating "principles of sound science for ecosystem-based and adaptive management," and by being "transparent" and "informed by stakeholders and the public." 159 The report notes that many of the federal administrative agencies responsible for planning with respect to the ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes are already authorized by their enabling legislation to implement CMSP "consistent with and under the authority of these statutes." 160 The framework is simply in place to "provide all agencies with agreed upon principles and goals to guide their actions under their authorities, and to develop mechanisms so that federal, state, tribal, and local authorities, and regional governance structures, can proactively and cooperatively work together to exercise their respective authorities." 161 If, however, any agency identifies a procedural or substantive legal constraint preventing full cooperation with the CMSP guidelines, the NOC would work with the agency to evaluate whether legislative or regulatory changes are necessary and appropriate. 162 Among the several guiding principles for CMSP, necessary to achieve the nation's goals, are that CMSP Plans would be: informed by "the best available science-based information, including the natural and social sciences;" guided by the precautionary approach as set forth in the Rio Declaration; 163 and "implemented in accordance with customary international law, including as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and with treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party." 164 The geographic scope of the CMSP planning area in the United States would include the territorial sea, EEZ, and the Continental Shelf, and would "extend landward to the mean high-water line." 165 In the Great Lakes region, the geographic scope of the planning area extends from the ordinary high-water mark to the limit of the U.S.-Canada international boundary. 166 Excluded are the submerged lands underlying the Great Lakes, which, on the U.S. side, are "entirely under the jurisdiction and ownership of the Great Lakes States." 167 No specific mention is made of the Gulf of Maine region or any other geographical region shared with Canada or Mexico.
To implement CMSP, the report calls for the United States to be subdivided into nine regional planning areas. The areas would be based on the large marine ecosystem (LME) scale, "defined on the basis of 161 consistent ecological conditions." 168 Modifications to the nine regional planning areas would be made to accommodate existing state or regional ocean governance bodies. The nine areas would include the Great Lakes, the Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Northeast, Gulf Coast, and West Coast, as well as Alaska, the Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean. 169 The report calls on the NOC to facilitate regional CMS Plans for each of the nine areas. 170 Regional planning bodies would be created with membership representing federal, state, and tribal interests "and indigenous community representatives with jurisdictional responsibilities or other interests (e.g., resource management, science, homeland and national security, transportation and public health) relevant to CMSP for that region."
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The report calls for "ex officio" membership by adjacent coastal states to encourage consistent planning among regions. 172 Key to the subject of this Article, moreover, the report acknowledges that the United States shares maritime boundaries with Mexico and Canada and suggests that the regional planning bodies "may include ex officio representation or observers from those nations."
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In creating the regional CMSP plans, the regional bodies are to identify regional objectives and build upon existing planning efforts (such as, for example, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Action Plan, and the ocean plans prepared by Massachusetts and Rhode Island).
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Efforts made by adjacent coastal nations to plan adjoining waters would be appropriately considered, therefore, in the regional planning efforts of the relevant U.S. regions. This means Canada's Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management plan should be among the plans considered by the U.S. Northeast Region in preparing a CMSP for the Gulf of Maine area.
IV. EXAMPLES OF BI-NATIONAL COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO TRANSBOUNDARY WATER BODIES
There are numerous examples of U.S.-Canada collaborative mechanisms, and a more recent count by the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment has identified some fifty binding and nonbinding agreements that the two countries have entered into to manage 168 cross-border issues.
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Not surprising, the overwhelming number of these agreements are non-binding, with only eight having a mandatory obligation on the parties to comply with the terms and conditions identified therein. 176 The need and importance of these agreements to U.S.-Canada relations has been highlighted by numerous observers 177 and most recently, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) of the Government of Canada has joined with several other federal departments and outside experts and stakeholders to examine the growing significance, scope, and nature of cross-border regional relationships, and to explore their importance for the Government of Canada. In the November 2008 Final Report, the Director General of PRI stated:
Clearly, a turning point has been reached, where the management of Canada-U.S. relations is evolving into something much more dynamic and sophisticated-involving not only the Canadian and U.S. federal governments, but the provinces and states, private businesses and civil organizations as well, in a plethora of informal and formal relationships and networks all concerned with the practical problem-solving of common challenges and issues in the border regions of Canada and the United States. More than anything, this growing involvement of players reflects a maturing of the Canada-U.S. relationship, and nowhere is this more evident than in the borderland regions, where cross-border regional relationships are flourishing. To provide an understanding of the significance of these agreements to the well-being of Canada-U.S. relations, the shared ecosystems and the people who depend on them, this section will highlight two such agreements. The first of these is the binding and long established Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the second is the non-binding and much more recent Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin and Puget Sound Ecosystem.
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A. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA or the Agreement) was first entered in 1972.
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It was a product of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909-the foundation of U.S.-Canada transboundary water management.
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The Boundary Water Treaty provides for joint management between the countries of their shared waterways, performed under the authority of the International Joint Commission, a body with investigative and adjudicative authority whose six politically-appointed members equally represent both nations. 182 When, after World War II, scientists and others grew increasingly alarmed at the poor water quality of the Great Lakes and their ongoing degradation, the two nations knew something must be done. The GLWQA was born out of concern over "grave deterioration of water quality on each side of the boundary to an extent that is causing injury to health and property on the other side." 183 The GLWQA set water quality objectives and created programs to achieve them. 184 It further defined the functions of the International Joint Commission, transforming it into an "environmental protection institution."
185 Under the Agreement, the IJC is responsible for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data from both nations regarding water quality of the boundary waters, and advising the authorities of both nations with regard to carrying out the terms of the 179. For a more detailed assessment of these two agreements, Agreement. 186 Thus, while the IJC is actively involved in overseeing the GLWQA and helping to achieve its primary goals, the foremost responsibility for enforcing the agreement and, in particular, the water quality standards it contains, rests with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Environment Canada.
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The original GLWQA focused on phosphorous pollution, and while it had some success in reducing the impact of phosphorous discharge on the Great Lakes, scientific discoveries of other persistent organic chemicals degrading the water tempered the Agreement's overall success. 188 The Agreement was amended significantly in both 1978 and 1987, striving to eliminate the impact of toxic chemicals on the Lakes and prevent new discharges of any additional toxic substances. 189 The GLWQA has been criticized for its "sub-treaty status" (since it was never approved by the U.S. Senate) and for lacking adequate enforcement provisions.
190
It is not, for example, easy for adversely affected citizens to sue a responsible party for failure to enforce the Agreement. 191 Nonetheless, the ICJ has made efforts to include citizens in its decision-making process. Following the ICJ's twelfth biennial report, released in 2004, the ICJ undertook a major public comment period to determine how effective the CLWQA had been. 192 The synthesis of comments from over 4000 sources is included in a report the ICJ issued in August 2006. 193 The major recommendations of the report are that the Parties, among other things:
• Enter into a replacement Agreement that is more "action- • Establish a Steering Committee for the GLWQA comprised of heads of the Parties' appropriate environmental protection and related agencies.
• Provide "a more clear and meaningful role" for the IJC in implementing the Agreement. 194 This increased public participation, to some, compensates for the claim that GLWQA fails to contain adequate enforcement provisions. 195 The fact that the parties turn, at least occasionally, to their citizens for feedback creates accountability and political pressure to comply with the Agreement.
As a model for the Gulf of Maine's boundary waters, the GLWQA has much to recommend, in particular the strong role of the IJC and the representation by both parties on that commission. In addition, the lead environmental agencies of both nations are responsible for protecting the boundary waters of the Great Lakes, placing responsibility on the highest administrative authorities with the greatest ability, in principle, to mandate compliance and conduct enforcement.
The GLWQA's connection with the Boundary Waters Treaty elevates its status as a binational policy tool, but its lack of treaty status and endorsement by each nation's legislative branch provides a lesson, for similar future agreements, in what to avoid. Lastly, as is commonly understood in ocean planning and other resource management programs today, public participation and the inclusion of state, local, and tribal entities is also key to sound decision-making, community support, and accountability.
B. Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin and Puget
Sound Ecosystem working collaboratively to address transboundary and global challenges confronting the shared ecosystem.
The ecosystem, known by the area's tribal and First Nations peoples as the Salish Sea, is comprised of the three basins of the Puget Sound, Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the Strait of Georgia on the Pacific coast of Canada and the United States. Known as the Georgia Basin and Puget Sound Initiative, the area is considered one of the most ecologically diverse in North America, possessing internationally significant species and habitats. With a population of some seven million inhabitants, pressures on the ecosystem include increasing population growth (at a rate that makes it one of the highest in North America), industrial expansion, and economic demands. These have led to poor air quality, toxic contamination of marine and fresh water, loss or degradation of farmlands, wetlands, and wildlife habitat, and decline of culturally important species.
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The Statement of Cooperation promotes closer U.S.-Canada collaboration in addressing challenges confronting the ecosystem and serves to:
• publicly confirm the commitment by the two federal levels of government to transboundary collaboration for the health of the Georgia Basin -Puget Sound ecosystem; • recognize the special role and interests of Coast Salish Nations and Tribes;
• acknowledge and support the excellent efforts in our region related to ecosystem management; and, • establish a formal Canada-U.S. commitment at the regional level to work cooperatively on the challenges identified In the Statement of Cooperation, including sustainability.
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The Statement of Cooperation commits Environment Canada and the U.S. EPA to develop annual action plans and report to the public on progress. The most recent Action Plan (2008-2010) focuses on transboundary collaboration, sharing knowledge and information, and transboundary demonstration projects contributing to improved air quality, water quality, and habitat and species health. While the administration and management of the agreement are the responsibility of the two federal agencies, a working group responsible for developing the action plans and reporting on progress is comprised of additional Triggers behind the establishment of formal ecosystem-wide agreements in the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound area have been identified to include the growing recognition amongst decision-makers, stakeholders, and residents on both sides of the border, that jurisdictional lines on the map notwithstanding, they share a common airshed, common watersheds, a common home for migratory birds and fish, and common urban growth pressures.
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This recognition followed a number of successful sector-specific arrangements, both formal and informal, involving shared fish stocks and concerns with oil spills. It also drew on earlier efforts of the federal, provincial, and state governments on both sides of the border in advancing an ecosystem-based approach, and hence transboundary management, in the Puget Sound-Georgia Basin area. The spin-off effects of the formal efforts at collaboration have been remarkable with informal non-governmental partnerships, First Nation and tribal interests, and a host of other networks complementing the efforts of the government and oftentimes taking the lead in securing a more sustainable future for the area.
As noted by Hildebrand et al., these efforts have led to a crossjurisdictional sense of community among the residents of the shared ecosystem. 200 However, there are still a number of challenges to overcome for the full potential of these collaborative efforts to be realized. First, there is a need to ensure that transboundary partnerships are afforded the credibility and legitimacy required to be able to access resources and be assigned priority by responsible agencies in their planning processes. Second, it is essential to begin to move beyond the current level of arrangements to one in which a more comprehensive and more fully integrated system for transboundary cooperation can take place.
V. BI-NATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE GULF OF MAINE
Over the past decade, there has been an increasing recognition that effective ocean management requires an integrated approach that serves to balance the carrying capacity of the natural system with human demands and considers the impacts of all ocean sectors on the marine environment.
201 Furthermore, as described in Part III above, both Canada and the United States have individually embraced the notion of ecosystem-based management as a fundamental principle for addressing coastal and ocean-related impacts in an integrated manner and for reconciling multiple use conflicts at different geographic scales. From a collaborative perspective, the two countries have demonstrated efforts to adopt and implement an ecosystem-based approach in the Georgia BasinPuget Sound Initiative and in the evolving arrangements surrounding the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, as described in Part IV above.
This final section of the Article discusses a suite of transboundary policy objectives for the Gulf of Maine in general and Georges Bank in particular. It then provides some justification as to why these should be pursued at a bi-national level and explores a possible mechanism for meeting these objectives through the adoption of a more holistic approach to marine resource management for the Gulf of Maine.
A. Suite of Transboundary Policy Objectives
Having analyzed both the historical and current context surrounding U.S.-Canada relations in the Gulf of Maine, driven in large measure by the socioeconomic benefits provided by the shared ecosystem, we now focus on a suite of policy objectives that encompasses both existing interests (the fisheries) and potentially new or emerging ones (nonrenewable and renewable energy). In identifying these objectives, we have constrained ourselves to those issues that would be regional, ecosystemic, and tranboundary in scope. As such, policy objectives around issues that are localized within the state or province, although these may be extremely important and may even be common among the respective jurisdictions, are not discussed here. As has been noted repeatedly in this Article, the shared fisheries in the Gulf of Maine have been the central focus for discussion between the United States and Canada for decades, and, it has been argued, were a principal factor behind the decision to seek a judgment from the ICJ. Furthermore, current sectoral efforts between the two countries in managing the shared stocks appear to lend credence to a shared policy objective that would recognize the historical and socio-economic significance of the fisheries to this region, while seeking to jointly support stock rebuilding efforts. Linked to achieving these objectives is the need to take into account cumulative impacts, protect critical habitat for fish and other sensitive areas, and understand carrying capacity. Of particular importance is the need to fill knowledge gaps regarding the Georges Bank ecosystem. This important Bank still serves as a lucrative fishing ground, despite losses to landings, income, employment, and consumer benefits that would have been realized if the catch of groundfish were at their long term potential level instead of being reduced due primarily to overfishing.
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At the same time, existing knowledge on ecosystemic connectivity across the Hague Line is being increasingly recognized and the precautionary approach called for, so as to influence ocean management decision-making.
New Economic Uses
The main transboundary policy objective regarding new economic uses in the Gulf is the requirement to minimize negative impacts from these activities on other users of the area as well as the environment itself. Potential new uses include petroleum exploitation, natural gas transshipment, renewable energy development, and ocean farming.
In the debate surrounding petroleum exploitation and the Georges Bank moratorium, concerns were raised over the potential environmental impacts associated with all phases of petroleum exploitation. 204 During the exploratory phase, the effects of seismic-generated noise on marine mammals and fish behavior and mortality, at different stages of development, were identified. During exploratory and development drilling, the impacts arising from the release of drilling muds and cuttings, particularly on the lucrative scallop fishery, were cause for concern. At the production phase, the effects of produced water containing petroleum, heavy metal, and/or naturally occurring radioactive elements, on the commercially exploited biological resources 203 were raised. Also associated with the production phase was concern over the effects of petroleum spillage, whether through blowouts, chronic pipeline failure, or tanker accidents. While many of these concerns were applicable to any area of the offshore, they assumed an even greater significance when applied to the Georges Bank debate. This was due to the additional perceived linkages between the physical and biological processes occurring on the Bank and the belief that Georges Bank provided seed stock for other fishing areas in the region. As such, any disruption to these processes was seen as exacerbating the negative consequences of any catastrophic event that might occur on the fishery. Additional challenges to this transboundary policy objective from the non-renewable energy sector include the issue surrounding transshipment of liquefied natural gas in the waters of the Gulf and the threats to iconic species and humans in the event of ship strikes and more serious catastrophes. Of particular concern is the proposed project by Downeast LNG Inc., to be located in Washington County, Maine. The project would also include the transit of LNG vessels through both United States and Canadian waters to and from the LNG terminal in Robbinston, Maine. The intended vessel transit routes include the waters of the Gulf of Maine, Bay of Fundy, Grand Manan Channel, Head Harbor Passage, Friar Roads, Western Passage, and Passamaquoddy Bay.
Regarding the potential negative impacts that could arise from emerging activities associated with the renewable energy sector in the Gulf, there is limited specific knowledge to draw on. However, with the proposals increasing for wind-related projects and the emerging use of hydrokinetics as a source of renewable energy, these uses could challenge the achievement of the shared policy objective of minimizing impacts to existing users and the environment in the Gulf of Maine area. Similarly, by taking a proactive approach to anticipating the transboundary consequences of ocean farming in the Gulf of Maine, potential areas of conflict can be minimized.
Co-existence
It could be argued that the drawing of the Hague Line provided the legal basis for encouraging co-existence by Canada and the United States in the Gulf of Maine. However, the administrative boundary holds little relevance when addressing ecosystem-wide issues, and the need to achieve a transboundary policy objective concerning the use of principles of equity and fairness in the allocation of resource use and space in the Gulf is evident. The naïve assumption that all demands on a given ecosystem can be met ignores the inherent conflicting nature between many ocean activities and the underlying fact that "[w]here multiple desirable but competing objectives exist, it is not possible to maximize each . . . [and] in any system with multiple competing objectives, it will not be possible to meet every one." 205 The debate between just two ocean users-the fisheries and the nonrenewable energy sector in the Gulf of Maine-has led to a decision that favored the former use over the latter on both sides of the Hague Line. The message conveyed by this decision was that co-existence was not possible if the public good was to be served. However, with new and emerging uses of the ocean environment being developed and the impacts arising from the broader policy environment surrounding climate change, population growth, and energy security, the influences shaping decision-making are likely to become more complex. Given this scenario, it is logical to explore approaches that would allow for these transboundary policy objectives to be achieved while permitting the effective and efficient use of shared marine resources in the Gulf of Maine.
B. Achieving the Transboundary Policy Objectives
There are numerous factors which support our belief that these objectives for the Gulf of Maine should be pursued in a bi-national context, not the least of which was the explicit expectation by the Judges of the Chamber for collaboration between these two "friendly" nations. However, as has been noted in the case of shared fisheries management and with regard to the ecosystem-wide activities on the Pacific coast and the focus on water quality as an issue of concern in the Great Lakes, these efforts have resulted in less than stellar accomplishments.
We suggest that one mechanism that could serve the needs of both countries while addressing previous shortcomings is to develop and implement a cooperative bi-national agreement for marine spatial planning (MSP) for Georges Bank. This spatial area is identified rather than the entire Gulf of Maine as a means of taking a "learning by doing" approach to the pursuit of shared policy objectives that is ecosystemic, rather than sector or issue specific. We submit that Georges Bank has many of the characteristics that have been identified as benefiting from the application of an MSP approach. 206 These include: areas with high levels of activity in order to balance competing activities and ensure sustainable use of the oceans; areas where the likely increase of activity in the region and the potential to negatively and irreversibly affect the ecosystem (natural and human subsystems) is high; and areas in which there is a wealth of existing knowledge (scientific and local) of the area. Furthermore, focusing on a joint deliverable that is tractable yet adopts current thinking in integrated oceans management, displays international cooperative leadership on the part of both countries. It also demonstrates to individual sectoral stakeholders that a single sector focus to decisionmaking is no longer acceptable nor capable of meaningfully addressing the needs of any one particular sector, let alone the entire suite of legitimate ocean users in an era of principled oceans governance. 207 This proposal also addresses a current stated priority for MSP in the United States and, to a growing extent, Canada, and as such, is potentially consistent with directives at the highest levels of decision-making. It is consistent with UNLOSC articles respecting sovereign rights and powers of coastal states while demonstrating the obligation of the duty to cooperate in transboundary related matters. It adds scientific objective rationale to decision-making regarding the use of the marine resources and has the potential to be viewed as an acceptable process by all stakeholders. Most importantly, we suggest that an acceptable champion in the form of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment (GOMCME or the Council) exists to advance and successfully lead this initiative.
C. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment
The GOMCME was established in 1989 by an agreement signed by the Governors of Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire and the Premiers of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to cooperatively work to 206 . MSP is an iterative process involving: the identification of a geographic area based on ecosystem objectives; the collection of baseline information on the resources within the area; an understanding of the human activities and interactions with each other and the environment; the identification of a science-based plan that recommends the spatial areas for desired human activities based on current knowledge and a shared vision for a specified temporal period; the establishment of a permitting process and conflict resolution structures; and, a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to adjust the plan achieve sustainable development in the Gulf region, protect natural resources, enhance environmental quality, and maintain the ecological balance of the Gulf. 208 The establishment of the Council came about following the recognition that, as a shared resource to the residents of the area, there was no complementary governance structure in place to coordinate issues of common concern at the ecosystemic level. As such, the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment is the only transboundary, regional-scale governance institution in the Gulf of Maine which focuses on coordination of the marine-related activities of state and provincial governments in the region. The Council is supported by a Working Group of state/provincial/federal planners and resource managers, and five committees: Data & Information Management; Environmental Quality Monitoring; Habitat; Aquaculture; and Public Education and Participation. Operations of the Council are assisted by a Secretariat that rotates among the five jurisdictions on an annual basis, as does the chairmanship of the Council. 209 However, it is important to recognize that the GOMCME serves only a coordinating function and is not currently responsible for management decisions. These responsibilities rest with the agencies and departments that serve the members of the Council.
We argue that it is precisely because of its coordinating mandate that the Council is uniquely positioned to focus on issues that require or benefit significantly from regional coordination.
As such a transboundary organization, with existing mechanisms of collaboration at the municipal, state, provincial, national, and bi-national levels, the Council can facilitate progress towards common goals. Additionally, by assigning the specific role of coordinating MSP development and implementation for Georges Bank to the GOMCME, the existing challenge of attribution for work done by the Council which currently exists can be addressed.
It is not the intent of this Article to resolve all of the necessary administrative, legal, and technical issues required to move forward on our suggestion but rather to raise the issue for further consideration and possible adoption. It is worth noting that the Council itself has been exploring the value of pursuing more formal agreements among its members. exactly will an agreement serve; what opportunities might come from having such a tool implemented; when is an agreement likely to be supported; who needs to be convinced-can be specifically focused around a discussion of MSP on Georges Bank.
D. Challenges and Opportunities
Zoning is a term and concept typically applied to real property and thus conjures the notion of private property interests, a notion not comfortably acceptable to many who rightly view the ocean as public property held in trust by the government. One challenge to marine planning, therefore, is the notion that entities will acquire rights to use particular segments of the ocean in a private-property-like manner, to the discomfort of many citizens. 211 An additional challenge to marine spatial planning is its three-dimensional nature, requiring extensive data on multiple physical, chemical, biological, and even legal parameters. 212 Lastly, in the case of the Gulf of Maine, there is the real challenge discussed at length herein that actions by one nation in a shared water body significantly impact the resources and ecosystem of the waters of the neighboring nation. Accordingly, planning of transboundary waters should be undertaken in a bilateral effort, but such efforts are difficult to coordinate and their outcomes are very hard to enforce.
The opportunities presented by involving the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment in each nation's developing coastal marine spatial planning efforts are sufficiently rewarding, however, to overcome the challenges. The GOMCME is already engaged in trans-boundary scientific data gathering, even working to map the entirety of the Gulf of Maine basin. 213 The councilors making up the GOMCME represent federal, state, provincial, and non-governmental organization sectors, as well as the general public, from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. 214 They represent the authorities as well as the individual councilors likely to be called upon to serve on regional planning bodies in both countries. In other words, the proposed U.S. CMSP calls for regional planning efforts to include "indigenous community representatives with jurisdictional responsibilities or other 215 The GOMCME is ready-made for that role.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Gulf of Maine, the United States and Canada share common concerns about fisheries resources, the impact of global climate change, and the potential for ocean-based energy development. Although the ICJ decision setting the boundary between the countries established territorial rights and governance jurisdictions for fishing and energy development, among other things, it could not shield either nation from the impacts of the other's activities in the Gulf. After all, the ocean is fluid and threedimensional; its ecosystems are delicate, complex and interdependent; its resources are opaque and mobile; and its physical and chemical properties are affected by coastal and in-shore activities from afar, as well as ocean-based ones. Oceans do not lend themselves well to neat boundaries and limited jurisdictional authority. As each country has learned, moreover, managing the ocean sector-by-sector also does not work. Accordingly, both the United States and Canada have pledged to manage their respective ocean waters through "integrated management" whereby multiple agencies with myriad responsibilities are obliged to coordinate their activities toward a common, collective set of goals. Both countries have adopted principles of sustainability, and plan to govern using the precautionary principle, ecosystem-based management approaches, and sound scientific data. They also intend to make public participation the cornerstone of their ocean governance plans.
Given the common policy interests of both nations, then, it seems logical and appropriate for the United States and Canada to actively and progressively involve representatives from each other's relevant agencies when determining coastal and marine spatial planning regions and establishing their governing bodies. It would be appropriate for the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment in particular to be officially engaged in the CMSP efforts for the Gulf of Maine. The GOMCME is the only transboundary, regional-scale governance institution in the Gulf of Maine which focuses on coordination of the marine-related activities of state and provincial governments in the region. Should it be tapped to engage in U.S. and Canadian CMSP with regard to the Gulf of Maine, the GOMCME may serve as a model for similar transnational regional bodies to govern CMSP in other boundary 215 . INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR CMSP, supra note 157, at 12.
